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CHARLES BEARD & PROGRESSIVE
LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
G. Edward White*
Last year marked the 100th anniversary of the publication of
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.
When Beard’s work first appeared it was generally well received
in academic circles, but precipitated an outpouring of protests
from members of the general public, including former President
William Howard Taft and the then newspaper publisher Warren
1
G. Harding. In the next several decades, however, Beard’s claim
that those who framed the Constitution were “immediately,
directly, and personally interested in” the outcome of their labors
at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or lesser extent economic
2
beneficiaries from the adoption of the Constitution, was regarded
in historical circles as the best explanation of the framers’
motivation. But by 1968 Richard Hofstadter had concluded that
“Beard’s reputation stands like an imposing ruin in the landscape
3
of American historiography.” In the end, Hofstadter believed,
Beard “geared his reputation as a historian so closely to his
political interests and passions that the two were bound to share
4
the same fate.”
Hofstadter characterized Beard, along with Frederick
Jackson Turner and Vernon Parrington, as scholars who
“explained the American liberal mind to itself in historical terms,”
who “gave us the pivotal ideas of the first half of the twentieth
century,” and who “seemed to be able to make American history
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of
Virginia.
1. Taft suggested to a friend that Beard would have been more satisfied if the
Constitution had been drafted by “dead beats, out-at-the-elbows demagogues, and cranks
who never had any money.” RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS
212 (1968). Harding’s paper, the Marion, Ohio Star, characterized An Economic
Interpretation as “libelous, vicious, and damnable in its influence.” Id.
2. Id. at 216 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 324 (1913)).
3. Id. at 344.
4. Id. at 345.
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relevant to the political and intellectual issues of the moment.” 5
They were “Progressive” historians.
In this essay I want to explore the characterization of Beard
as a “Progressive” historian, because I believe that most
influential scholarship in legal and constitutional history from the
time Beard’s Economic Interpretation appeared through the
1960s, and beyond, shared Beard’s “Progressive” perspective. I
begin the essay by describing what Hofstadter found deficient in
Beard’s approach, and how those criticisms reflected the
dominant perspective of framing-era historians by the late 1960s.
I then turn back to “Progressive” legal and constitutional
historiography itself, outlining its central features and starting
premises, which were far closer to those of Beard than to those of
his historian critics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Next I discuss
another line of criticism of Beard, one that surfaced on the initial
publication of his Economic Interpretation, and chart the response
to that criticism by scholars who adopted a “Progressive”
approach. Finally, I seek to explain why a “Progressive”
perspective on American legal and constitutional history, despite
its obvious deficiencies, retained its scholarly influence for so
long.

*****
Hofstadter had initially been influenced by Beard, finding An
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution a book “of profound
and decisive importance” “[f]or those of us who came of age in
6
the 1920’s or 1930’s.” But by the 1960s Hofstadter had become
disaffected with Beard’s approach. The problem, for Hofstadter,
lay in Beard’s insistence that “[t]here is a dynamic relation
between interests and ideas, in which the workings of interests can
7
never be left out of account.” Although Hofstadter
acknowledged that as a “general proposition . . . ideas and
5. Id. at xii.
6. Id. at 345. Hofstadter was born in 1916 and read Beard’s popular history, The
Rise of American Civilization (1927), as an undergraduate at the University of Buffalo,
from which he graduated in 1936. He then entered a Ph.D. program in history at Columbia,
receiving his doctorate in 1942, where he read An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution. Hofstadter was active in left-wing politics in the 1930s, joining the
Communist Party in 1938 and resigning a year later. For more detail see DAVID S. BROWN,
RICHARD HOFSTADTER: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (2006).
7. Id. at 243.
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interests [were] somehow associated,” 8 he concluded that treating
ideas as inseparable from interests led to several difficulties.
One was that “ideas . . . will somehow be dissolved and that
9
we will be left only with interests on our hands.” Hofstadter
harbored a “suspicion that Beard . . . [was] looking for a way to
explain ideas on the assumption that when they were satisfactorily
10
explained they would be properly subordinated.”
Another difficulty was that “interests will be too narrowly
construed,” resulting in “too much emphasis [upon] the motives
and purposes of individuals and groups, not enough on the . . .
11
limitations imposed on men by particular historical situations.”
Beard did “not seem to have recognized,” Hofstadter maintained,
“that the way in which men perceive and define their interests is
in some good part a reflex of the ideas they have inherited and the
12
experiences they have undergone.” Ideas, for Hofstadter, were
invariably “repositories of past interests [that] . . . present . . .
13
claims of their own that have to be satisfied.” Beard’s treatment
of “ideas, . . . moral impulses, [and] cultural forces that could not
be closely tied to economic origins” was, Hofstadter concluded,
14
“often quite inept.”
In sum, Beard’s “ideas-interests formula” led him “to leave
out . . . the whole area of experience in which ideas and interests
are jumbled to a degree that the effort to divorce and counterpose
them becomes an artificial imposition [on] the realities of
15
history.” In Hofstadter’s view “the central, formative, shattering,
and then reintegrating experience of civic life” for the “generation
of the Founding Fathers” was “the Revolution,” “which . . .
16
galvanized their inherited store of ideas.” Beard’s account of the
Constitution missed “the moving force of the Revolutionary
17
commitment.” For Hofstadter, Beard's choice to emphasize the
“sweep of economic forces” not only made him "far less
18
interesting as a historian of ideas," it caused him to characterize

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 244.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 244–45.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the relationship between the American Revolution and the
framing of the Constitution in too simplistic a fashion.
The passages previously quoted from Hofstadter’s critique of
Beard reveal that his primary concern with Beard’s methodology
was what it left out. By insisting that there was an indissoluble
connection between interests and ideas, Beard’s approach invited
the conclusion that interests, in the end, drove ideas, so that ideas
eventually disappeared as a force of causal weight in history. As
applied to the generation that framed the Constitution, this
conclusion appeared counterintuitive. The central theme of the
framers’ historical experience, Hofstadter believed, was the
Revolution, by which he meant not just the war for American
independence but the whole complex of ideas and events that
inclined British colonists in America, over the last half of the
eighteenth century, to consider separating themselves from the
British Empire and establishing a new nation with a republican
form of government.
Hofstadter found it hard to credit that the “Revolutionary
experience” would not have shaped the framing of the
Constitution, which was drafted only 11 years after the
Declaration of Independence. But Beard’s approach, by insisting
that the Constitution was created by persons who perceived their
economic interests as being threatened by egalitarian and
redistributive impulses associated with the Revolution, “[lost]
19
touch with the moving force of the Revolutionary commitment.”
Beard “seems to have thought of men,” Hofstadter suggested,
as simply perceiving their interests and then, rather naturally,
drifting into the acceptance or the use of ideas that would
further them. He does not seem to have recognized . . . that the
way in which men perceive and define their interests is in some
20
good part a reflex of the ideas they have inherited. . . .

By the time Hofstadter’s critique of Beard appeared, a line
of scholarship emphasizing the singular importance of republican
ideas to the framing generation was beginning to gain
prominence. Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution was published in 1967; Bailyn’s The Origins
of American Politics in 1968; and Gordon Wood’s The Creation of
the American Republic in 1969. In 1972 Pauline Maier’s From
Resistance to Revolution provided more detail on the evolution of
ideas that influenced advocates for American independence, and
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 244.
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in 1975 J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, a
culmination of work that had begun in the early 1960s, traced the
“radical” ideas about sovereignty and governance endorsed by
American separatists to English antecedents. In 1972 Robert
Shalhope concluded that a new historiographical “synthesis,”
highlighting the importance of republican theories of government
21
in the revolutionary and framing decades, had emerged. In that
“synthesis” there seemed little room for Beardian interpretations.
Wood observed that “[i]t seems obvious by now that Beard’s
notion that men’s property holdings, particularly personalty
holdings, determined their ideas and their behavior was so crude
22
that no further time should be spent on it.”
Wood’s comment suggested that to the extent that the
“republican synthesis” literature dominated historians’
conceptions of the framing era, Beard’s work on the framers
would be dismissed. But the “republican synthesis” literature
eventually came to be seen by some scholars as monocausal or
23
reductionistic, and in 2003 Robert McGuire produced a “new
economic interpretation of the United States Constitution” that
24
employed statistical and econometric analysis in the course of
arguing that supporters of the Constitution tended to own public
25
and private securities and to live close to navigable waterways.
So perhaps we need to take a fresh look at Beard.
My effort here is to look again at Beard through lenses first
supplied by Hofstadter: to see Beard as one of the first of a group
of twentieth-century scholars who revolutionized the study of
American legal and constitutional history, and whose influence is
in some respects still felt. I am employing Hofstadter’s term
“Progressive” as a label for the group, and will be describing their
contributions across a range of issues, only a few of which Beard
addressed in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.

21. Robert Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972).
22. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787,
626 (1969).
23. Robert Shalhope’s Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM.
& MARY Q. 334 (1982), represents a partial response to that reaction.
24. ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION 3–13, 33–34, 38–41
(2003).
25. See, Id. at 43, 53–54, 65–66, 68–69 tbls.3.5 & 3.6, 74 tbl.3.8, 75, 76 tbl.3.9, 77, 79
tbl.3.10, 81 tbl.3.11, 91–92, 154. McGuire also argued that “delegates who were in personal
debt, owned slaves, or represented more isolated backcountry areas generally were
significantly less likely to have ratified than were other delegates.” Id. at 159. He concluded
that “had different interests been represented at the state ratifying conventions, there
likely would have been no ratification of the Constitution as drafted.” Id. at 160.
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*****
Elsewhere I have sketched what I consider to be the defining
elements of a “Progressive” historiographical stance toward
26
issues in legal and constitutional history. The stance contains five
such elements, each of which is related to the others. Not all
“Progressive” works of legal history exhibit all the elements,
because the elements consist of attitudes toward distinct topics,
such as law, judging, controlling themes in history, and the
relationship between legal doctrine and its social context, and not
27
all the works address each of those topics.
The defining attitudes of “Progressive” works of legal
historiography amount to a set of starting assumptions. Those
assumptions are not invariably treated as the equivalent of truth;
in some works the author employs historical data in an attempted
demonstration of the truth of an assumption. In those same works
another assumption may inform the author’s analysis but simply
be taken for granted. Nonetheless each of the assumptions may
be said to implicitly or explicitly reinforce one another.
Initially, I want simply to list the defining elements, without
commenting on their relationship to one another or giving them
an order of priority. The elements are:
—A characterization of American history, including
American legal history, as an ongoing clash between antagonistic
“classes” and “interests,” with “class” and “interest” being
conceived of in economic terms, although reflected in social and
28
political alignments.
—A conception of judging as an instrumental exercise driven
by the ideology of the judge, with a corresponding emphasis on
the outcomes reached in cases and the short-run political, social,
26. G. Edward White, The Lost Origins of American Judicial Review, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1145, 1146–48 (2010).
27. I am giving only some examples of works in legal and constitutional history
exhibiting a “Progressive” perspective: one could list numerous others. I am assuming that
were a work of legal or constitutional history I have labeled “Progressive” to address one
of the topics not included in its coverage, the writer’s attitude toward that topic would be
consistent with the defining elements of “Progressive” legal historiography.
28. Hostadter noted this element in Beard’s An Economic Interpretation; see
HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 209-10, and one can see also see it, in a quite different
context, in CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 187, 189–91, 328–34, 337–41 (1914), whose first edition appeared in 1914.
Haines’s Ph.D. dissertation, published in 1909 as The Conflict over Judicial Powers in the
United States to 1870, was directed by Beard.
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and economic consequences of those outcomes, an emphasis on
the social and economic backgrounds, and political affiliations, of
judges, and a de-emphasis on the reasoning of judicial opinions,
especially insofar as that reasoning assumes that the authority of
legal sources can be neutrally discerned by judicial interpreters of
29
those sources.
—A skeptical attitude toward claims that “law” is an
authoritative body of rules that can be thought of as independent
from the attitudes or goals of those who interpret it, independent
from or transcendent of politics, or as timeless and thus not fully
30
dependent on its social context.
—A view of legal decisions, legal principles, and legal rules
as “mirroring” their social context, so that changing conditions in
society, and changing public attitudes, will inevitably be reflected
31
in changes in the law.
—A belief that the legal rhetoric employed by judges and
other officials to justify decisions often serves to obscure rather
than to illuminate the true bases of those decisions, so in order to
understand the “meaning” of decisions one needs to look
elsewhere, such as toward the historical context of the decisions,
their political, social, or economic consequences, or the
personalities and ideological leanings of the officials who made
32
them.
Next I want to suggest how the elements might be seen as
mutually reinforcing. If one begins with a view of American
history, and contemporary American culture, as a clash of
opposing “classes” seeking to promote their social, political, and
economic “interests,” it follows, first, that judges and other legal
officials, like the rest of the American public, need to be seen as
representatives of particular classes, and of particular interest
groups, whose attitudes toward public issues will be affected by
29. See Max Lerner, John Marshall and the Campaign of History, 39 COLUM. L. REV.
396, 406–15, 421–30 (1939); HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 14, 16 (1948); ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS
AND THE RULE OF LAW 2 (1960).
30. PRITCHETT, supra note 29, at 14–20, 73–75; OSCAR AND MARY HANDLIN,
COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 at 208–12 (1947); FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 at 35–37, 74–79, 119–
21, 213–14, 217 (1955).
31. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
32. HAINES, supra note 28, at 252–63, 325–26; CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J.
FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 166–80, 198–99, 249–57, 265–67, 363, 369–84, 402–03,
426–27, 430–31 (1930); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 360–
61, 365–66, 542–43, 548, 557, 559 (1946).
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their affiliations. It also follows that responses to legal issues will
be no different from responses to other issues that affect the
public, so one should expect the “class” and “interest group”
affiliations of judges to affect their decisions in the same manner
that they might affect other public officials or private citizens.
These conclusions suggest that much of the language of the
law, which features technical discussions of legal sources that are
often unintelligible to persons without legal training, which
almost never allude to “classes” or “interests,” and which only
rarely detail the short-run political, social, or economic
consequences of a decision, needs to be ignored or discounted by
persons seeking the meaning of legal decisions. Instead
contemporary readers of legal decisions need to look elsewhere
for that meaning, such as in the practical consequences of the
decisions’ outcomes, or in the backgrounds and ideologies of the
judges who decided them. And readers of historical decisions can
look in an additional place, in the social, political, and economic
contexts of decisions made in particular eras, for there will be a
“fit” between the decisions and the political, social, and economic
practices and attitudes of their times.
If legal decisions are understood in this fashion, “law” comes
to be seen less as a “mysterious science,” unintelligible to those
without legal training, or as a transcendent and timeless body of
principles, designed for recourse in all situations. Instead law and
legal institutions become drawn in to the “Progressive” narrative
of American history, so that individual Supreme Courts are
described as personifying the views of particular classes or
interests, changes in the law are seen as “mirroring” changes in
society at large, and there is no meaningful separation of law from
politics, law from economics, or law from the social configurations
of American life.
It followed from the Progressive narrative’s rejection of law
as an entity with some degree of autonomy from its social context
that Progressives also displayed skepticism toward the construct
of a “rule of law” in American culture that transcended and
constrained the particularistic attitudes and agendas of legal
decision makers. Progressive narrators assumed that humans
made laws in accordance with their ideological predilections,
which were themselves the products of social, political, and
economic conditions and experiences. Since humans made laws,
they could unmake them, so, in charting the course of American
legal and constitutional history, the central questions for
historians were about how existing laws served to further, or stand
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in the way of, the political or economic or social “interests” of
lawmakers.
The narrative of Progressive legal history was thus
relentlessly modernist in its starting premises. Its practitioners
presupposed that the principal causal agents in history were
human beings holding power and exercising their will. They also
presupposed that human “will” was a product of the social
experiences of human actors. And since neither law nor any other
putative causal agencies in the universe operated independently
33
of human will, legal history was best understood as a series of
episodes in which human actors reacted to their social experiences
by creating laws and policies designed to further their “interests”
as they currently understood them. The fact that legal policies
were policies about governance, as distinguished from policies
about the economic marketplace or social arrangements or
political organization, did not divest them of their human-created,
socially contingent, “interested” character.
No single Progressive historian’s scholarship addressed all of
the defining themes of the genre, but each launched his work from
a set of modernist assumptions about causal agency. Beard’s
Economic Interpretation had nothing specific to say about judges
or judicial interpretation of the Constitution: his focus was on
those who drafted the document, not those who subsequently
interpreted it. But it followed from his conclusions about the way
the Constitution came into being—as a document designed to
promote the economic interests of a majority of its framers—that
judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions would
emanate from the perceived interests of the interpreters.
The critical step in Beard’s analysis of the Constitution’s
framing was thus one that he did not address, let alone defend. He
assumed that it made complete sense to think of the provisions of
the Constitution as reflecting, at bottom, the economic interests
of one group or another of its framers. His methodology, which
included tracking the “interests” of delegates, was predicated on
the belief that if one described those interests accurately,
conclusions about the motivation of the framers would follow.
33. Such agencies, in “premodern” epistemology, included history as a source of
recurrent foundational principles, the figure of an omnipotent deity, and nature, all of
which were thought to significantly confine the capacity of humans to “cause” anything. I
discuss premodernist epistemology in more detail in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 5–6, 786–87 (abr. ed. 1991), and the transition from
premodernist to modernist theories of causal agency in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 5–9 (2000).
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Although Beard spent a good deal of time tracking interests and
distinguishing one set of economic interests (“personalty”) from
another (“realty”), he spent almost no time supplying arguments
in support of his conclusions. On the contrary, he assumed that
once a delegate’s “interest” was characterized, the only remaining
step was to demonstrate how that delegate’s interest might (or, in
some instances, might not) benefit from replacing the Articles of
34
Confederation government with the Constitution.
At one point Hofstadter, in seeking to explain the initial
excitement that Beard’s Economic Interpretation generated,
spoke of the book as having “rescued constitutional scholarship
from the atmosphere of mythology and turned it [to] a search . . .
35
for the social and economic sources of the controversy.” That
comment was ambiguous. Hofstadter might have been suggesting
that prior to Beard scholarship on the Constitution had unduly
venerated that document, or he might have been suggesting that
prior scholarship had been too inclined to focus on the legal text
of the Constitution and its interpretations, without examining the
social and economic setting in which the Constitution was drafted.
Beard had paid some attention to the Constitution’s social and
economic context: his characterizations of the “interests” of
delegates were presented after he had detailed sources of
economic conflict in late eighteenth-century America, with
holders of public securities being pitted against those whose
income was mainly generated from their landownings. But Beard
had been disinclined to provide explanations for why owners of
“personalty” and owners of “realty,” assuming that they had
36
conflicting economic interests, concluded that those interests
inclined them to support or oppose the Constitution. Beard
thought it sufficient to match up interests with votes, and let the
reader conclude that interests drove votes.
I am thus inclined to conclude that much of the excitement
initially generated by Beard’s Economic Interpretation, and much
34. At one point in his analysis of Beard’s Economic Interpretation Hofstadter
cataloged 11 instances in which Beard asserted that those who supported the Constitution
were “immediately, directly, and personally interested in . . . deriving economic advantages
from the establishment of the Constitution.” HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 215–16
(emphasis omitted). It was apparently enough for Beard to demonstrate that a delegate
had a particular economic “interest”; the conclusion that the delegate was supporting (or
opposing) the Constitution to derive economic advantage naturally followed.
35. HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 226.
36. Among the criticisms of Beard leveled by Robert Brown was that Beard
overestimated the intensity of conflict among economic interests at the time of the
Constitution’s framing. See, e.g., ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE
CONSTITUTION 185, 193, 197–98 (1956).
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of its continued influence in the historical community through at
least the 1940s, came from the fact that both Beard and his
audiences shared views about the course of history, the nature of
historical change, the relationship between law and its social
context, and the essence of legal decisionmaking that I have
labeled modernist. Beard was one of the early American
historians to assert that the framing of the Constitution, like other
pivotal episodes in American history, was “really” a clash among
competing economic interests, and that law was no different from
other dimensions of American life in being profoundly affected
by those interests. His audiences took that assertion as
presumptively correct, and were impressed that Beard had
supplied details from the framing generation.

*****
Seeing Beard as an early twentieth-century modernist, and
Progressive legal historiography as being driven by modernist
premises, can thus serve as a partial explanation for the initial
impact of An Economic Interpretation and its continuing
37
influence. But the modernist and Progressive dimensions of
Beard’s history do not explain, at least facially, another feature of
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. That feature was
noted by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he first read Beard
38
in 1916. I believe it to be the basis of the strongly negative
reaction to Beard’s work in some sectors of the American public.
Holmes wrote Frederick Pollock in 1916 that he found
Beard’s claim that “the men who drew the Constitution belonged
to the well-to-do classes and had the views of their class”
39
unremarkable. But he added that Beard had also intimated that
37. I am suggesting that the scholarly arguments and conclusions in each of the
works cited in notes 28–32, were derived from modernist starting premises.
38. Holmes wrote letters reacting to An Economic Interpretation to both Frederick
Pollock and Felix Frankfurter in that year. In the letter to Pollock, written on July 12, he
noted that he had “taken up An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the U.S.”
Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (July 12, 1916), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 237 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). In the letter to
Frankfurter, written four days later, he described Beard’s book as one that Frankfurter
had “recommended and sent.” Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Justice Felix
Frankfurter (July 16, 1916), in HOLMES & FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE
1912–1934, at 53 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996).
39. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock, supra note
38.
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the framers’ motives were “self-seeking,” and thus somehow
disreputable. Holmes characterized that intimation as “a covert
40
sneer.” He would later be more explicit to Pollock, writing that
he found An Economic Interpretation “a rather ignoble . . .
investigation of the investments of the leaders, with an innuendo
41
even if disclaimed,” and composed of “[b]elittling arguments.”
Holmes expressed the same reaction in letters to Harold
Laski and Felix Frankfurter. He suggested to Laski that
“notwithstanding [Beard’s] disavowal of personal innuendo,” An
Economic Interpretation “encouraged . . . the notion that personal
interests on the part of the prominent members of the Convention
accounted for the attitude they took,” thus making the book “a
42
stinker.” To Frankfurter, Holmes wrote that “[t]he disclaimed
yet ever-present innuendo that they all were influenced by having
some stock that would appreciate” was “rather unworthy
43
trifling.”
Holmes thus read Beard’s work as an example of what early
twentieth-century reformers called “muckraking”: an effort to
expose the baser motives of public officials. That reaction raises
two questions that relate to the themes of this essay. First, why did
Holmes think that Beard’s ascription of economic motives to the
framers was intended to “belittle” their support for the
Constitution, and was in that respect “ignoble” and “unworthy”?
Second, if Holmes was accurate in his conclusion that Beard was
seeking to “expose” the framers’ attitudes in the fashion of a
muckraker, was this goal of Beard’s generally shared by
Progressive legal historians? In suggesting that political, social, or
economic motives lay behind the decisions of legal decision
makers, were they also suggesting that those motives were
somehow base or sinister?
Holmes seems to have taken Beard’s cataloguing of the
economic interests of the framers as an effort to expose them as
hypocrites, voting for a document that promoted their interests
while justifying it on other grounds, or as ignoble public servants,
substituting their private concerns for the public good. But in the
same letter to Pollock in which he suggested that Beard's
40. Id.
41. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (June 20,
1928), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 222–23 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941).
42. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Nov. 13, 1928), in 2
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1109 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
43. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Justice Felix Frankfurter, supra
note 38.
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approach included a "covert sneer," he said that no evidence was
required to conclude that the framers "belonged to the well-to-do
44
classes and had the views of their class." It was as if Holmes took
for granted that members of the framing generation would hold a
“class” viewpoint on public issues, but also thought it “ignoble”
for a historian to maintain that such a viewpoint actually drove
their responses to those issues.
The apparent inconsistency in Holmes’s position can be
unraveled if one first assumes that all public officials have
“interests,” but then associates “nobility” in those officials with
disinterestedness. In Holmes’s terms, delegates to the
Philadelphia convention and state ratifying conventions could be
expected to have been members of the wealthier classes, and to
instinctively hold the views of those classes where an issue had
“class” overtones. But at the same time one should expect that
public servants would support policies that they believed
furthered the welfare of all citizens, even where the policies did
not favor their own interests. Those positions could be said to be
“disinterested.” And they could also be said to reflect a civic45
minded ethos of public service.
So when Beard totaled up the economic “interests” of the
framers and then suggested that their support for or opposition to
the Constitution reflected those interests, he was ignoring the
ethos of disinterestedness for public servants. “It cannot be said,”
Beard wrote, “that the members of the Convention were
46
‘disinterested.’” That was what Holmes found “unworthy” and
“ignoble” in Beard’s approach. Beard’s “covert sneer” came, for
Holmes, from Beard’s implicitly suggesting that the framers did
not give a fig for the ethos of disinterestedness, and
unapologetically voted their interests.
Here we get an inkling of what distinguished Holmes’s
reaction to Beard from the subsequent Progressive historians who
44. 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters, supra note 38.
45. At the time of the framing of the Constitution the ability to vote in elections was
limited in most states to male “freeholders,” those who owned land in fee simple.
Periodically, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, state legislatures debated
whether to extend the franchise to persons other than freeholders. In those debates some
members of legislatures who were freeholders supported extending the franchise. The
disinterestedness canon suggested that even though those freeholders recognized that the
extension would be against their “interest” in the sense of potentially diluting their voting
power, they supported the extension out of civic-mindedness, believing that public officials
should be elected by larger numbers of the population, or that voting should be an essential
element of civic life in a republic.
46. BEARD, supra note 2, at 151.
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found Beard’s approach inspiring. Holmes took for granted that
there were “classes” in American society and that members of
those classes reflected their membership in ideological positions.
The framing generation, with its repeated talk of the “passions”
and “interests” that were endemic in public officials as well as
other humans, agreed with Holmes. But Holmes also shared with
the framing generation the idea that the appropriate ethos of
governance was one that sought to restrain “interested”
tendencies in public officials. The Progressives denied that any
such ethos existed. The interests and “class views” of officials
shaped politics.
To their conviction that political, social, and economic
“interests” lay beneath the decisions of public officials, including
legal officials, the majority of twentieth-century Progressive
historians added another ingredient, an inclination to be
“levelers” in the “class conflicts” that defined American history.
To the extent that the policies of governing officials favored the
wealthy classes over the poorer ones, or the more socially
prominent classes over the less socially prominent ones, or
entrenched political elites over groups that sought to reform the
status quo or gain elite status, many Progressive historians
instinctively opposed those policies. Their efforts to demonstrate
that particular decisions favored, at bottom, the wealthy, the
socially prominent, and the politically entrenched were thus more
than modernist-inspired attempts to show that human ideology
shaped governance. They were also intended as political critiques
of the decisions, which were frequently labeled “conservative,”
“elitist,” or “protective of the status quo.”
The “leveling” instincts of many Progressive historians help
explain the continued resonance of Progressive legal
historiography over several of the decades succeeding the first
appearance of An Economic Interpretation. By 1912 Holmes, born
into a prominent Boston family in 1841, had concluded that “the
47
crowd now has substantially all there is.” One can see how
someone of his age and background might have reached that
conclusion. And leveling tendencies would continue for the next
several decades. The last major restriction on suffrage, the
47. By that locution, a favorite phrase of Holmes’s, he meant that taxes and economic
regulations had sufficiently redistributed wealth that “cutting off the luxuries of the few”
would not “make an appreciable difference.” Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
to Harold Laski (May 24, 1919), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 142, 143 (Richard A. Posner
ed., 1992). Holmes had used the identical phrase in an October 28, 1912 letter to Lewis
Einstein, quoted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES supra, at 141.
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exclusion of women voters, would vanish in 1919; labor unions
had emerged in the late nineteenth century and collective
bargaining had become a policy goal of the federal government
by the 1930s; by the 1920s anti-trust laws and social welfare
legislation had regulated economic activity and redistributed
economic benefits to a degree unanticipated fifty years earlier; by
that same decade a mandatory federal income tax had been
established; the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great
Society programs could have been seen as progressive exercises
in social leveling, economic redistribution, and as efforts to
minimize the political strength of entrenched elites.
Looking back from these experiences, Progressive historians
could feel as if they were participating in “winner’s history.” The
flow of events in the American past suggested that despite the
anti-democratic motives of the framers, American society had
become increasingly more democratic, and despite the efforts of
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century public officials to
perpetuate the hegemony of entrenched social, political, and
economic elites, leveling tendencies had eventually won out. Thus
historical scholarship that exposed the inevitably “conservative”
and elitist “interests” of officials holding power was offered
against the background of successive leveling movements. It both
brought the true motives of official decision makers to light and
reminded its readers that, in the end, those officials’ goals would
be thwarted by the inevitabilities of history. Beard’s Economic
Interpretation was a model of that sort of scholarship.
So the Progressive historians were not just modernists. They
were, on the whole, enthusiasts for leveling. That tendency gave
an edge to their cataloguing of the “interested” dimensions of
decsion making by entrenched officials: they believed that in
fashioning policies to support their particularistic economic
concerns, those officials were typically supporting a
“conservative,” elitist status quo against leveling threats. The
Progressives’ recognition that in the end the leveling tendencies
won out enabled them to place the officials they studied on the
“wrong” side of history. By exposing the “real” motives of
influential legal decision makers in American history, Progressive
legal and constitutional historians were not seeking to fault their
subjects for following their “interests”: at bottom, that was what
public officials did when making policy. Instead they were seeking
to fault their subjects for favoring the status quo when confronted
with leveling pressures for change, and demonstrating that in the
end their subjects had bet on the wrong side.
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*****
At this point we are in a position to better understand what
Hofstadter meant in saying that Beard’s work “explained the
American liberal mind to itself in historical terms.” By “liberal
mind” Hofstadter meant the twentieth-century Americans who
had supported the Progressive movement, the New Deal, and the
successive reform movements through the Great Society. The
twentieth-century legal and constitutional historians whom
Hofstadter associated with liberalism believed, with Beard, that
American history was a clash of “interests,” that the interests of
legal officials holding power, at any point in American history,
were generally aligned with the status quo, and thus the decisions
of those officials tended to support that status quo.
Those representatives of the “liberal mind” had also learned,
however, that over time in American history leveling tendencies
prevailed over tendencies to preserve established social, political,
and economic arrangements. They thus not only took Beard’s
description of the “clash of interests” at the time of the framing as
presumptively accurate, they noted that over time the framers’
efforts to preserve the wealth and power of certain “classes” were
thwarted by events. To them, Beard’s Economic Interpretation
was thus not only accurate but prophetic. That was what
Hofstadter meant in saying that twentieth-century liberals had
seen Beard as “mak[ing] American history relevant to the
48
political and intellectual issues of the moment.” That was why a
set of Beard’s Progressive successors took it upon themselves to
explain American legal and constitutional history in terms that
resonated with his vision.
Beard can thus be seen as one of the first of a line of
twentieth-century legal historians who combined a belief that
interest group affiliation and ideology drove legal decisionmaking
with a growing conviction that, over time, leveling tendencies
would inevitably overcome the efforts of entrenched interests to
resist them. Armed with those assumptions, they set out to
recover the “real” motivations of legal decision makers and to
place them in a historical narrative featuring the clash of classes
and interests. In that narrative they treated the canon of
disinterestedness for public officials as illusory and the rhetorical
justifications of judges and legislators as surplusage. All of those
48.

HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at xii.
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tendencies marked them as modernists, twentieth-century
liberals, and Progressives in their approach to history.
From the perspective of modernist legal and constitutional
historians who read Beard’s work in the context of their own
experience with American culture and politics, from the First
World War through the Great Society, leveling currents did seem
to dominate that experience. Each of the established late
nineteenth-century features of social and political stratification—
race, ethnicity, gender, inherited wealth, affiliation with elite
educational institutions—seemed to have disintegrated under the
pressure of leveling movements. If one viewed that history
through modernist lenses, the contested legal and constitutional
issues of the twentieth century appeared as a series of clashes
between interests in which, over time, leveling interests prevailed.
But by the late 1960s framing-era historians had come to
recognize that although a Beardian approach to history seemed to
have much explanatory power for the twentieth century, it
seemed to be missing something fundamental in the framing
period. For a time Beard’s historian critics had granted him his
starting premises and quarreled with him over matters of
execution. But by the late 1960s Hofstadter and the contributors
to the “republican synthesis” had concluded, without explicitly
stating it, that Beard’s modernist assumptions fit poorly with
those of the framing generation because the framers were not
modernists. Far from embracing a “progressive” vision of history
and human agency as a causal force driving historical change, they
feared the unlimited exercise of official power as leading to
corruption and tyranny. Far from being advocates for broader and
deeper public participation in governance, they equated
democracy with licentiousness, demagoguery, and mob rule. They
may have believed that at bottom humans were driven by their
passions and their interests, but they also believed in an ethos of
disinterestedness for participants in public life, not only because
they found that ethos consistent with the aspirations of honor and
virtue for elites, but because they thought it was necessary to
check the baser tendencies of humans.
Beard’s Economic Interpretation was thus, in the end,
anachronistic in its approach to the framing period. In a similar
fashion Beard’s Progressive successors in the fields of American
legal and constitutional history have too readily imposed their
modernist preconceptions about history, law, judicial
decisionmaking, and constitutional interpretation on events from
earlier time periods. As a result Beard’s successors produced a
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body of scholarship whose explanatory powers lay mainly in the
resonance of their starting assumptions to their audiences. Now
those assumptions themselves seem the products of past eras,
leaving a whole corpus of Progressive contributions to legal and
constitutional history ripe for revision. An exciting prospect, but
one, with Beard’s example in mind, worth sober reflection.

